Day 107. The MOU is not signed. Qalibaf (the man designated to sign it for Iran) posted language on June 14 that functionally echoed the tripwire his colleague Araghchi established on June 9: continuing the path is not possible if the US cannot restrain Israel. The Qatar mediators are still in Tehran. The IRGC is still issuing audio warnings on VHF Channel 16 and still launching one-way attack drones at commercial shipping in the Strait.

Both tracks are running simultaneously because they are operated by different institutions that do not require each other's authorization to act.

That is the core structural problem with any Hormuz MOU. Qalibaf can sign it. Araghchi can call it the closest it has ever been. Neither of them can give the IRGC Navy an order to stand down, and there is no mechanism in the leaked 14-point framework that assigns that authority to anyone who can actually execute it.

Markets are pricing the deal as equivalent to an open strait. The deal is not equivalent to an open strait. The gap between those two readings is the analytical problem this piece addresses.