The world just agreed this deal matters. Seven ships have crossed Hormuz since it was announced two days ago.

That gap - between the G7 communique issued in Evian on June 17 and the near-zero AIS-visible traffic in the Strait - is the single most important number heading into Friday’s signing ceremony in Lucerne. The deal has political momentum it has not had at any point in 110 days. The physical reopening remains a July event at best.

G7 Closes as the Deal’s Multilateral Backstop

G7 leaders issued a statement on June 17 saying they “support and are ready to contribute” to US-Iran deal implementation. This is not a formality. It converts a bilateral Trump-Iran arrangement into a G7-backed framework - with UK and France already committed to naval mine clearance (MCM) vessels and European leaders publicly invested in the outcome. The diplomatic cost of any actor collapsing the deal before June 19 has reached its highest point in the crisis arc.

Russia sanctions were tightened in the same communique. Europe got something it wanted. Trump got multilateral cover for a deal his domestic critics had framed as weak. The architecture is as durable as it has been.

EU sanctions on Iran are a separate track. Von der Leyen’s “real change on ground” conditionality from June 15 was not walked back in the Evian statement. Iranian barrels do not return to global markets on June 19. That is a Q4 2026 event at earliest.

IRGC Compliance: 35 Vessels, but Read the Fine Print

Iran’s IRGC Navy reports 35 commercial vessels transited Hormuz under its coordination in the past 24 hours - up from 15 on June 16. Progressive. Insufficient. AIS-visible traffic since the June 15 announcement totals ~7 ships. The gap reflects AIS suppression by owners transiting dark to avoid both CENTCOM enforcement attention and their own P&I terms, plus Iranian domestic port-to-port traffic and small vessels below commercial tracking thresholds. The commercially relevant metric - laden VLCCs and Suezmaxes carrying crude to Asian refiners - remains near zero.

~550 vessels are stranded on both sides of the Strait. At two million barrels per VLCC, that is a significant volume of oil sitting in anchorages.

Second Day Without a Dahiyeh Strike

For the second straight day, IDF operations stayed south of Araghchi’s stated tripwire. Strikes in Nabatieh al-Fawqa and a coastal drone hit at Ansariyeh; five IDF soldiers wounded by Hezbollah explosive drones in the buffer zone. Active, dangerous, below-tripwire. Netanyahu’s operational restraint has survived two full overnight windows post-announcement.

Hezbollah has not announced a stand-down. The live risk is a Hezbollah escalation above the south Lebanon tactical threshold - not a planned Israeli decision, but an incident that gives Netanyahu domestic cover to respond and puts Araghchi’s tripwire language back in play. The G7 multilateral endorsement now adds a diplomatic layer above that tripwire: any pre-June-19 Dahiyeh strike would be a direct rebuke of G7 leaders who just staked their credibility on this outcome.

The Unpriced Risk: July

Brent at $80.78 on June 17 is correctly pricing the political signal. It is not pricing the supply bridge gap. Saudi SPR exhaustion hits ~July 19. The IEA coordinated release window closes July 1. Both mechanisms expire before Hormuz physical throughput can replace the volume normally transiting the Strait. The 30-day physical reopening timeline runs from the June 19 signing to ~July 19 - exactly when the Saudi bridge runs dry.

The Lloyd’s war-zone designation requires 5-7 business days of review after the first confirmed unescorted clean transit. Mines need clearing or route certification before laden VLCCs will move. IRGC audio warnings on VHF Ch 16 need to formally stop. Under an optimistic scenario, laden VLCCs start moving in earnest around July 5-8. Under a base case with any friction, July 10-15.

Bab el-Mandeb: Day 5 of Houthi silence. Two days from the threshold for meaningful probability revision. No formal stand-down.

What to Watch Through June 19

Any IDF strike on Dahiyeh or Beirut remains the highest single collapse signal - a 15-20% probability over the 48-hour window. Mojtaba Khamenei has been publicly silent for three-plus days; his absence is de facto permission, but a statement opposing the deal before June 19 would be immediate Alert-level. Iran’s formal response to the UK/France MCM vessel offer is the single biggest accelerator for the physical reopening timeline - acceptance compresses mine clearance by 2-3 weeks.

Watch the IRGC’s VHF Ch 16 audio warnings. When they stop, the Lloyd’s review clock starts. That signal matters more than anything said in Lucerne on Friday.