How the Ceasefire Happened

At 6:13 PM Eastern Time on April 7, 2026, Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that the United States would suspend bombing Iran for two weeks. At that moment, the strike packages were loaded. Targets had been assigned. B-52s were in holding patterns. The most destructive night of the war was 107 minutes from execution.

Fifteen minutes after the post, US forces received the stand-down order.

How that order came to exist begins not in Washington or Tehran but in Rawalpindi, where Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, spent the final night of the crisis on the phone with three men: US Vice President JD Vance (calling from Budapest), Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. One man, two encrypted lines, three capital cities, and a ticking clock.

This is how the war’s first ceasefire came together.

The Mediator Nobody Expected

Pakistan was not the obvious choice. When Operation Epic Fury began on February 28, Washington’s initial diplomatic channels ran through Oman, Turkey, and Egypt, each with established credibility as Gulf mediators. Pakistan was a peripheral player: an energy-starved South Asian state scrambling to keep its lights on as Hormuz closed.

Three things changed that calculation.

First, Pakistan’s navy acted while diplomats talked. On March 9, nine days into the crisis, the Pakistan Navy launched Operation Muhafiz-ul-Bahr (“Guardian of the Sea”), deploying eight warships to escort merchant vessels through contested waters. It was the first non-Western independent escort operation of the crisis, and it earned Islamabad credibility with both sides. Iran saw a Muslim-majority military acting to protect commerce, not enforce American will. Washington saw a partner willing to put ships in the water.

Second, Asim Munir had something no other mediator possessed: functional relationships with both the American and Iranian security establishments simultaneously. The army chief had spoken directly with Trump by late March. He was also in contact with the IRGC’s surviving command structure through channels built over decades of managing the Balochistan border and the Chabahar corridor. When Iran needed a messenger it could trust not to be an American proxy, Munir was the answer.

Third, Pakistan was desperate. With 50% of its oil imports transiting Hormuz, petrol prices had surged 20%, schools were closed, the government had moved to a four-day workweek, and Pakistan Day celebrations were cancelled. Islamabad was not mediating from comfort. It was mediating from survival. That gave Sharif and Munir a sincerity no other broker could match.

Building the Channel: March 23 to April 6

Week 1: The Offer (Mar 23-24)

Pakistan’s diplomatic timeline begins on March 23, when its Foreign Office offered Islamabad as a venue for direct US-Iran talks. The same day, Trump postponed his first power-plant deadline by five days, citing “productive conversations.” Whether Pakistan precipitated the postponement or merely coincided with it remains disputed.

On March 24, PM Sharif posted publicly that Pakistan “stands ready and honoured to host meaningful and conclusive talks.” That evening, Army Chief Munir held his first confirmed call with Trump. An Israeli official told NPR that “planning underway for talks in Pakistan later this week.” Trump reposted Sharif’s statement on Truth Social.

Hours later, Iran cracked. A senior Iranian FM official told CBS: “We received points from the U.S. through mediators and they are being reviewed.” It was the first admission that Tehran was engaging at all.

Week 2: The Plan (Mar 25-28)

Washington sent Iran a 15-point peace plan via Pakistani intermediaries on March 25. The plan was maximalist: one-month ceasefire, surrender of 450 kg of 60%-enriched uranium, enhanced inspections, missile range limits, proxy reductions. Iran rejected it within 48 hours and issued a five-point counteroffer demanding reparations, a permanent end to war, and international recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.

Pakistan FM Ishaq Dar publicly confirmed “indirect talks” on March 26. By March 27, Trump extended the energy-strike deadline to April 6, at what he claimed was Iran’s request. The Pakistani channel was the only plausible mechanism for that request to reach Washington.

On March 28, Dar announced a concrete deliverable: Iran had agreed to transit 20 Pakistani-flagged vessels through Hormuz, two ships per day. It was a small number, but it proved Iran would negotiate passage with a country it trusted, and that Pakistan could deliver on commitments.

Week 3: The Quartet (Mar 29-Apr 2)

Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt sent their foreign ministers to Islamabad on March 29 for two days of consultations. Originally planned for Ankara, the meeting relocated to Pakistan’s capital, a symbolic acknowledgment of Islamabad’s central role.

No Americans or Iranians were present. This was alignment, not negotiation. The goal was a framework that bridged the gap between Washington’s 15 points and Tehran’s five conditions. Turkey’s FM Fidan and Egypt’s delegation focused on sequencing: what had to happen first, second, third for both sides to claim a win.

Pakistan’s Dar played host and chair. The outcome was not a public communique but a shared understanding of what a viable ceasefire framework would require: an immediate halt to strikes, Hormuz reopening within days, and a structured timeline for broader negotiations. The quartet carried these elements to both capitals through their respective channels.

Meanwhile, Pakistan kept building bilateral bridges. On March 31, Pakistan and China jointly announced a five-point proposal calling for ceasefire and Hormuz reopening. China’s involvement expanded the mediating coalition and signaled to Tehran that its closest major-power partner endorsed the diplomatic path.

By April 2, Dar told reporters Pakistan would “continue with Iran-US mediation despite obstacles.” Public acknowledgment of difficulty; private signal that the line stayed open.

Week 4: The Framework (Apr 3-6)

What would become the “Islamabad Accord” took shape over the first week of April. Pakistan crafted a two-phase proposal: Phase 1 was a 45-day ceasefire with Hormuz reopening; Phase 2 was the negotiation of a permanent settlement.

On April 5, Oman added another thread. Deputy foreign ministers from Iran and Oman met with specialists to discuss “smooth flow of passage through the Strait of Hormuz,” drafting a bilateral transit protocol. Oman is the other littoral state at the Hormuz narrows; its participation gave any transit framework geographic legitimacy that Pakistan alone could not provide.

On April 6, the 45-day ceasefire proposal was formally submitted to both Washington and Tehran. Iran rejected it within hours. Tasnim news agency quoted officials: “A 45-day temporary ceasefire proposed under the shadow of war does not align with Iran’s policy.” Tehran wanted a permanent deal, not a temporary pause.

Trump extended his deadline one more time, to 8 PM ET on April 7, with the most explicit threat yet: “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one.”

The Final Night: April 6-7

Iran’s rejection of the 45-day plan cleared the table for what both sides actually wanted to discuss.

On the night of April 6, Iran sent its 10-point counteroffer to Washington via Pakistan. The points included: a permanent end to war, US force withdrawal from regional bases, sanctions lifting, release of frozen Iranian assets, war reparations, and a formal Hormuz safe passage protocol. A US official who read it called it “maximalist.” Trump said it was “significant” but “not good enough.”

And then the final night began.

Asim Munir took his position at the center of a three-way call structure that would last through the night and into Tuesday afternoon. On one line: VP Vance in Budapest and Witkoff in Washington. On the other: Araghchi in Tehran. Egyptian and Turkish foreign ministers worked the margins, trying to help bridge gaps. Pakistani mediators shuttled amended drafts between the parties.

Vance was the primary American interlocutor for this phase, working through Pakistani counterparts rather than direct with Iran. The format was deliberate: it preserved both sides’ public positions. Iran was not “negotiating with America.” Pakistan was “passing messages.”

Framing was the critical question. Iran would not accept a “temporary ceasefire” because it implied the war could resume at will. The US would not agree to a “permanent end” because it implied conceding all leverage. The solution was a two-week pause described differently by each side. Trump would call it a pause while Iran opens Hormuz. Iran would call it a halt to aggression while it coordinates safe passage. Same outcome, different narratives.

By Monday evening Washington time, Munir had US approval for an updated two-week proposal. The question was whether Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s new supreme leader since the assassination of his father on February 28, would accept.

Sources told Axios that Khamenei was “actively involved in the process on Monday and Tuesday.” Fifty-five years old, injured in the same strikes that killed his father, with six family members dead, the new supreme leader faced the biggest decision of his tenure. The IRGC wanted retaliation. His own 10-point counteroffer was the framework. Two weeks of pause versus one night of power-grid destruction: Khamenei chose the pause.

Munir made the final call to close the deal. Trump posted at 6:13 PM. The stand-down came at 6:28 PM. Strike packages that would have destroyed Iran’s electrical grid, its remaining bridges, and what was left of its civilian infrastructure were aborted in flight.

The Terms: Two Versions of One Deal

Deliberate ambiguity defines the agreement.

Trump’s version (Truth Social):

“Subject to the Islamic Republic of Iran agreeing to the COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz, I agree to suspend the bombing and attack of Iran for a period of two weeks.”

Araghchi’s version (X/Twitter):

“If attacks against Iran are halted, our Powerful Armed Forces will cease their defensive operations. For a period of two weeks, safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will be possible via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.”

Trump frames it as Iran capitulating and opening the strait. Araghchi frames it as Iran’s military generously permitting transit under its supervision, with caveats. “Technical limitations” could mean anything: mines, navigational restrictions, vetting procedures, or simply a mechanism to reimpose control if talks collapse.

That gap is intentional. Both sides need domestic narratives. Trump needs “mission accomplished” after 40 days, 15 US KIA, and 520+ wounded. Iran needs “we stopped the aggressor” after 3,597 confirmed dead and a devastated military. Pakistan’s achievement was crafting language elastic enough for both framings to coexist, at least for 14 days.

The Lebanon Fault Line

Within hours, the ceasefire’s structural flaw surfaced. PM Sharif announced that “the US, Iran and their allies have agreed to an immediate ceasefire everywhere, including Lebanon and elsewhere.” Netanyahu’s office responded that the ceasefire “does not include Lebanon” and the IDF would continue ground operations against Hezbollah.

Pakistan had apparently brokered what it understood as a comprehensive agreement. But Israel never agreed to that scope. On Wednesday morning, Hezbollah paused fire; Israel renewed strikes on south Lebanon.

Lebanon is the fault line that could collapse the whole structure. Hezbollah is Iran’s most important proxy. If Israeli operations in Lebanon escalate during the two-week window, Tehran faces pressure to abandon the ceasefire framework. Netanyahu understood this dynamic when he excluded Lebanon, and he may be counting on it.

The Supporting Cast

Pakistan ran the play, but it did not run alone.

Turkey hosted the original mediation channel alongside Egypt. FM Hakan Fidan worked the margins on the final night, helping bridge gaps in the ceasefire language. Turkey’s value was its relationship with Iran as a trading partner and NATO member simultaneously.

Egypt provided the Suez Canal dimension. Any Hormuz settlement affects Egyptian transit revenues, giving Cairo a material stake. Egypt’s FM participated in the Islamabad quartet and the final-night shuttle.

Saudi Arabia joined the Islamabad quartet on March 29, a notable shift for a nation under active Iranian missile attack. Riyadh’s participation signaled to Washington that Gulf states would accept a negotiated framework, not just a military one. The Saudis also gave the US access to King Fahd Air Base earlier in the crisis, a reversal of prior refusal, proving they could work both levers at once.

Oman contributed the Hormuz technical framework. As the only other country at the strait’s narrows, Oman’s bilateral protocol with Iran gave any transit arrangement a veneer of littoral-state legitimacy rather than mere capitulation.

China added heavyweight. Wang Yi conducted 26 calls with counterparts throughout the crisis. Beijing’s Middle East envoy “shuttled across” the conflict region. The March 31 joint Pakistan-China five-point proposal showed Tehran that its most important economic partner endorsed the negotiating track. Sources suggest China provided “a last-minute nudge” that helped secure Iran’s final approval.

What the World Said

Global reaction combined relief with strategic positioning.

UN Secretary-General Guterres called on all parties to “abide by ceasefire terms in order to pave the way toward a lasting and comprehensive peace,” thanking Pakistan and other mediators.

Germany’s Chancellor Merz thanked Pakistan specifically for its mediation, advocating diplomatic channels for “a lasting end to war.”

Ukraine’s FM Sybiha drew the sharpest parallel: “American decisiveness works,” calling for similar action on Russia. The comparison was intentional and uncomfortable for Washington.

Russia’s Zakharova claimed the ceasefire proved that “aggressive, unprovoked attack” strategy suffered “a crushing defeat.” Former President Medvedev warned: “there’ll be no cheap oil.”

Spain’s PM Sanchez was the most skeptical: “Momentary relief must not make us forget the chaos, the destruction and the lives lost.”

India emphasized “unimpeded freedom of navigation” through the Strait, a pointed reminder that New Delhi’s concern was always commerce, not the war itself.

What Comes Next

PM Sharif invited delegations to Islamabad for Friday, April 10. VP Vance is expected to lead the US side. The format has not been confirmed, but the most likely structure is indirect talks, with Pakistan shuttling between American and Iranian delegations in separate rooms.

Iran’s 10-point proposal sets the agenda. The most negotiable elements are probably the Hormuz protocol and sanctions relief. The least negotiable: US force withdrawal and war reparations. The nuclear question, unresolved since the strikes on Natanz, Arak, and Ardakan, looms over everything but may be deferred to a separate track.

By ~April 21, the ceasefire expires. If Friday’s talks produce a framework for extension, Hormuz stays conditionally open. If they stall, the entire 40-day crisis resumes with strike packages already loaded and a president who has stated publicly that Iran’s “entire country can be taken out in one night.”

Pakistan built a bridge over a minefield, in the literal and figurative sense. Whether anyone crosses it safely depends on the next 13 days.