Country Brief: Pakistan

Energy Profile

MetricValue
Crude oil consumption~550K bbl/day
Crude oil imports~470K bbl/day (~85% import-dependent)
Domestic production~80K bbl/day
Hormuz-dependent imports~85% of crude + 99% of LNG from Qatar/UAE via Hormuz
Strategic reserves (SPR)None — no formal SPR program
Refining capacity~450K bbl/day (5 major refineries; low complexity)
LNG imports~10 MTPA; 99% from Qatar/UAE via Hormuz
Natural gas domestic production~3.5 Bcf/day (declining fields)

Reserve Status (Disputed)

ProductGovt (OGRA)Industry (PPDA)
Petrol26 days14 days
Diesel25 days14 days
Crude (refineries)~10 days
LPG~15 days
LNGCritical — 99% from Qatar/UAE via Hormuz

Note: Government (OGRA) and industry (PPDA) reserve estimates diverge by nearly 2x on petrol and diesel. OGRA figures likely include pipeline fill and in-transit stocks; PPDA counts only usable terminal/depot inventory. Actual days-of-cover likely closer to PPDA estimates under crisis draw rates.

Key Infrastructure

  • Pak-Arab Refinery (PARCO), Mahmood Kot: 120K bbl/day, largest refinery; mid-country location
  • Pakistan Refinery Ltd (PRL), Karachi: 47K bbl/day; coastal refinery near Keamari port
  • National Refinery Ltd (NRL), Karachi: 65K bbl/day, processes domestic and imported crude
  • Attock Refinery Ltd (ARL), Rawalpindi: 43K bbl/day; processes domestic crude from Potwar basin
  • Port Qasim LNG Terminal (EETPL): 600 mmcfd regasification capacity. Primary LNG import facility
  • Engro Elengy LNG Terminal, Port Qasim: 600 mmcfd, second FSRU-based terminal
  • Karachi/Keamari Ports: Primary crude oil import terminals; handle ~90% of seaborne energy imports
  • Gwadar Port: Deep-water port; no oil/LNG terminal infrastructure operational (CPEC plans shelved)

Key Actors

  • PM Shehbaz Sharif: declared energy emergency (Mar 9); implementing austerity measures
  • OGRA (Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority): sets fuel prices; publishes reserve data (disputed by industry)
  • PPDA (Pakistan Petroleum Dealers Association): industry body; publishes alternative reserve estimates
  • PARCO (Pak-Arab Refinery Co.): joint Pakistan-UAE venture; largest refinery; leading emergency procurement
  • PSO (Pakistan State Oil): state-owned fuel distributor; launched emergency non-Hormuz tenders
  • PNSC (Pakistan National Shipping Corporation): state shipping line; MT Karachi stranded near Strait
  • Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division): policy coordination, emergency response

Crisis Exposure (Hormuz Closure, Day 11)

  • 85% of crude and 99% of LNG imports transit Hormuz; near-total exposure
  • Two crude tankers stranded near Strait (incl. PNSC’s MT Karachi)
  • LNG supply effectively severed; both Port Qasim terminals receiving zero cargoes since closure
  • PM Shehbaz announced comprehensive 14-point austerity plan (Mar 9-10):
    • All schools, colleges, universities closed March 10–31 (not just 2 weeks)
    • 4-day work week for all government employees
    • 50% of public and private sector workforce ordered to work from home (except essential services)
    • Federal cabinet forgoing 2 months’ salary
    • 60% government vehicles off roads; 50% fuel allowance cut
    • Weekly fuel price revisions replacing fortnightly cycle
  • Petrol hiked Rs 55/liter (+21%) to Rs 321.17 ($1.15/litre), the largest single increase in Pakistan’s history. Diesel at $1.20/litre
  • Pakistan Navy launched “Operation Muhafiz-ul-Bahr” (Mar 9) — escort operations for Pakistani merchant vessels with 8 warships: 4 Tughril-class (Type 054A/P, Chinese-built) frigates + 4 Yarmook-class OPVs. Two merchant vessels already under escort. First non-Western independent escort operation of the crisis. May expand to non-PNSC commercial shipping
  • Deputy PM Ishaq Dar consulting Saudi/Bahraini FMs on regional de-escalation
  • PARCO: 140,000 barrels procured via alternate routes (70K from UAE/Fujairah, 70K from Saudi/Yanbu)
  • PSO launched emergency non-Hormuz tenders; Iranian crude imports suspended
  • Restored 350 mmcfd domestic gas production from marginal fields
  • Saudi ambassador pledged to “stand firmly with Pakistan”

LNG Terminal Status & Gas Sector Impact

  • Both FSRU-based LNG terminals at Port Qasim idle since Hormuz closure; no LNG cargoes arriving
  • Pakistan LNG Ltd (PLL) has no spot purchase options; long-term Qatar contracts under force majeure
  • Gas shortfall estimated at 1.0–1.5 Bcf/day once LNG stockpiles exhaust (days, not weeks)
  • Fertilizer sector: Agritech Fertilizer shut down on LNG force majeure; other urea plants at risk
  • Power sector: ~30% of electricity generation is gas-fired; load-shedding to increase sharply
  • CNG stations (transport fuel for millions) facing closure as piped gas reallocated to power/fertilizer

Economic Impact

  • Monthly oil import bill: could hit $600M at current prices
  • Every $10/bbl oil price rise = $1.5–2B added to annual current account deficit
  • Trade deficit up 25% to $25B (Jul–Feb FY26)
  • Inflation at 7%, heading to 8–9% with fuel price pass-through
  • Textile sector: 25–30% freight cost surge expected; export competitiveness under threat
  • PKR under pressure; central bank burning reserves to defend currency

Structural Vulnerabilities

  • 85% import-dependent on Gulf crude with no diversification
  • 99% of LNG from Qatar/UAE, a single-chokepoint dependency
  • No strategic petroleum reserve (no proper SPR program)
  • Limited refining capacity (~450K bbl/day) with low complexity; cannot process heavy/sour grades efficiently
  • No pipeline bypass infrastructure. Gwadar-Kashgar oil pipeline (CPEC) shelved; IP gas pipeline from Iran incomplete
  • CPEC energy portfolio is power plants, not oil/gas supply; China offers no supply lifeline
  • Declining domestic gas production (~3.5 Bcf/day) with no major new discoveries
  • Fiscal fragility: IMF program constraints limit government’s ability to subsidize fuel prices

TankerBrief Coverage Angle

South Asia energy desks, IMF/World Bank policy watchers, LNG traders (Qatar long-term contract holders), shipping companies on Karachi routes, fertilizer/agriculture commodity analysts. They need: reserve drawdown tracking (OGRA vs PPDA figures), LNG terminal status, emergency procurement volumes, fuel price/subsidy decisions, IMF program compliance under crisis spending, and Pakistan-Saudi/UAE bilateral energy diplomacy.