Country Brief: Pakistan

Energy Profile

Metric	Value
Crude oil consumption	~550K bbl/day
Crude oil imports	~470K bbl/day (~85% import-dependent)
Domestic production	~80K bbl/day
Hormuz-dependent imports	~85% of crude + 99% of LNG from Qatar/UAE via Hormuz
Strategic reserves (SPR)	None — no formal SPR program
Refining capacity	~450K bbl/day (5 major refineries; low complexity)
LNG imports	~10 MTPA; 99% from Qatar/UAE via Hormuz
Natural gas domestic production	~3.5 Bcf/day (declining fields)

Reserve Status (Disputed)

Product	Govt (OGRA)	Industry (PPDA)
Petrol	26 days	14 days
Diesel	25 days	14 days
Crude (refineries)	~10 days	—
LPG	~15 days	—
LNG	Critical — 99% from Qatar/UAE via Hormuz	—

Note: Government (OGRA) and industry (PPDA) reserve estimates diverge by nearly 2x on petrol and diesel. OGRA figures likely include pipeline fill and in-transit stocks; PPDA counts only usable terminal/depot inventory. Actual days-of-cover likely closer to PPDA estimates under crisis draw rates.

Key Infrastructure

• Pak-Arab Refinery (PARCO), Mahmood Kot: 120K bbl/day, largest refinery; mid-country location
• Pakistan Refinery Ltd (PRL), Karachi: 47K bbl/day; coastal refinery near Keamari port
• National Refinery Ltd (NRL), Karachi: 65K bbl/day, processes domestic and imported crude
• Attock Refinery Ltd (ARL), Rawalpindi: 43K bbl/day; processes domestic crude from Potwar basin
• Port Qasim LNG Terminal (EETPL): 600 mmcfd regasification capacity. Primary LNG import facility
• Engro Elengy LNG Terminal, Port Qasim: 600 mmcfd, second FSRU-based terminal
• Karachi/Keamari Ports: Primary crude oil import terminals; handle ~90% of seaborne energy imports
• Gwadar Port: Deep-water port; no oil/LNG terminal infrastructure operational (CPEC plans shelved)

Key Actors

• PM Shehbaz Sharif: declared energy emergency (Mar 9); implementing austerity measures; cited by Trump in ceasefire announcement (Apr 7); thanked by Iran FM Araghchi for “tireless efforts”
• Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir: direct calls with President Trump; key back-channel actor with credibility in both Washington and Tehran; cited by Trump in ceasefire announcement (Apr 7); thanked by Iran FM Araghchi
• OGRA (Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority): sets fuel prices; publishes reserve data (disputed by industry)
• PPDA (Pakistan Petroleum Dealers Association): industry body; publishes alternative reserve estimates
• PARCO (Pak-Arab Refinery Co.): joint Pakistan-UAE venture; largest refinery; leading emergency procurement
• PSO (Pakistan State Oil): state-owned fuel distributor; launched emergency non-Hormuz tenders
• PNSC (Pakistan National Shipping Corporation): state shipping line; MT Karachi stranded near Strait
• Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division): policy coordination, emergency response

Crisis Exposure (Hormuz Closure, Day 40)

• 85% of crude and 99% of LNG imports transit Hormuz; near-total exposure
• Two crude tankers stranded near Strait (incl. PNSC’s MT Karachi)
• LNG supply effectively severed; both Port Qasim terminals receiving zero cargoes since closure
• PM Shehbaz announced comprehensive 14-point austerity plan (Mar 9-10):
  • All schools, colleges, universities closed March 10-31
  • 4-day work week for all government employees
  • 50% of public and private sector workforce ordered to work from home (except essential services)
  • Federal cabinet forgoing 2 months’ salary
  • 60% government vehicles off roads; 50% fuel allowance cut
  • Weekly fuel price revisions replacing fortnightly cycle
• Petrol hiked Rs 55/liter (+21%) to Rs 321.17 ($1.15/litre), the largest single increase in Pakistan’s history. Diesel at $1.20/litre
• Pakistan Day parade cancelled (Mar 23) due to oil crisis + austerity
• Pakistan Navy launched “Operation Muhafiz-ul-Bahr” (Mar 9) — escort operations for Pakistani merchant vessels with 8 warships: 4 Tughril-class (Type 054A/P, Chinese-built) frigates + 4 Yarmook-class OPVs. First non-Western independent escort operation of the crisis
• PARCO: 140,000 barrels procured via alternate routes (70K from UAE/Fujairah, 70K from Saudi/Yanbu)
• PSO launched emergency non-Hormuz tenders; Iranian crude imports suspended
• Restored 350 mmcfd domestic gas production from marginal fields
• Abu Dhabi missile debris: 1 Pakistani national killed (Mar 27-28); 4th Pakistani national also died from separate missile debris incident
• Brent crashed to ~$94/bbl on ceasefire (Apr 7-8, down from ~$110-111); monthly oil import bill pressure easing but structural vulnerabilities unchanged
• 800+ vessels trapped in and around Hormuz; mines still active; full commercial resumption weeks to months away even under ceasefire

Ceasefire Broker & Diplomatic Role (Mar 23 - Apr 8 — DECISIVE)

Pakistan brokered the war’s first ceasefire, the most consequential diplomatic achievement in the country’s recent history.

The Ceasefire (Apr 7)

• TWO-WEEK CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCED (Apr 7, ~6 PM ET): Trump announced the ceasefire citing PM Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir by name: “Based on conversations with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir, of Pakistan… agreed to suspend the bombing and attack of Iran for a period of two weeks.”
• Iran’s FM Araghchi thanked Pakistan PM Sharif and Army Chief Munir for “tireless efforts” in reaching the ceasefire
• Iran agreed to “safe passage via coordination with Armed Forces” through Hormuz. Iran’s 10-point counteroffer upgraded from “maximalist” to “workable basis on which to negotiate”
• Peace talks expected Friday in Islamabad. Pakistan hosting the definitive negotiations
• Pakistan announced ceasefire “everywhere, including Lebanon” — contradicted by Netanyahu, who said Lebanon is excluded and IDF operations continue. This disconnect will be tested daily
• Oil crashed ~14-16% on the announcement: Brent to ~$94, WTI to ~$94.55 (worst day since April 2020)

Diplomatic Escalation Timeline (Mar 23-Apr 7)

• PM Shehbaz offered to host US-Iran talks (Mar 24): “Pakistan stands ready and honoured to host meaningful and conclusive talks for a comprehensive settlement.” Trump reposted the offer on Truth Social
• Army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir in direct calls with President Trump. Munir is the key back-channel actor, with credibility in both capitals
• 15-point US peace plan delivered via Pakistan (Mar 25): Washington routed its most concrete diplomatic proposal through Pakistani intermediaries. Plan includes one-month ceasefire, uranium surrender, missile limits, proxy reductions
• FM Dar confirmed indirect talks ongoing (Mar 26). Pakistan facilitating message-passing between US envoy Witkoff and Iran FM Araghchi
• Pakistani interior minister held secret meeting with Iranian ambassador (Mar 27)
• 20-SHIP HORMUZ DEAL (Mar 28-29): FM Dar announced Iran agreed to allow 20 Pakistani-flagged vessels through Hormuz; 2 ships daily under the arrangement. Al Jazeera confirmed
• FOUR-NATION ISLAMABAD MEETING (Mar 29): FMs from Pakistan (Dar), Turkey (Fidan), Egypt, Saudi Arabia convened 2-day consultations in Islamabad. Described as “most coordinated regional effort yet.” Meeting relocated from Ankara to Islamabad due to Pakistan’s central role
• 45-day Islamabad Accord proposed (Apr 6): Egyptian, Pakistani, and Turkish mediators submitted two-phase ceasefire plan. Iran rejected 45-day format as temporary
• Iran’s 10-point counteroffer delivered via Pakistan (Apr 6-7): Demanded permanent end to war, sanctions lifting, Hormuz safe passage protocol, reconstruction. Trump called it “not good enough” then “workable basis” within hours
• TRUMP CLAIMS IRAN AGREED TO “MOST OF” 15 POINTS (Mar 30): “They gave us most of the points.” Iran has NOT confirmed

Strategic Assessment

Pakistan delivered what no other mediator could: a framework both sides accepted. The ceasefire massively elevates Pakistan’s diplomatic stature. From a country that entered the crisis as one of its most vulnerable energy victims, Pakistan emerged as the indispensable intermediary. Army Chief Munir’s direct line to Trump combined with Pakistan’s cultural and religious ties to Iran created a unique dual-access channel no other state possessed. Hosting Friday’s Islamabad talks puts Pakistan at the center of whatever permanent framework emerges. The 20-ship Hormuz deal demonstrated Pakistan could extract concrete concessions from Iran while maintaining Tehran’s trust. This is Pakistan’s most significant diplomatic achievement since the 1999 Kargil crisis mediation, and surpasses it in global visibility.

LNG Terminal Status & Gas Sector Impact

• Both FSRU-based LNG terminals at Port Qasim idle since Hormuz closure; no LNG cargoes arriving
• Pakistan LNG Ltd (PLL) has no spot purchase options; long-term Qatar contracts under force majeure
• Gas shortfall estimated at 1.0–1.5 Bcf/day once LNG stockpiles exhaust (days, not weeks)
• Fertilizer sector: Agritech Fertilizer shut down on LNG force majeure; other urea plants at risk
• Power sector: ~30% of electricity generation is gas-fired; load-shedding to increase sharply
• CNG stations (transport fuel for millions) facing closure as piped gas reallocated to power/fertilizer

Economic Impact

• Monthly oil import bill: ~$500-550M at ~$94/bbl (down from projected $600M+ at $110+); ceasefire provides partial fiscal relief
• Every $10/bbl oil price rise = $1.5-2B added to annual current account deficit
• Trade deficit up 25% to $25B (Jul-Feb FY26)
• Inflation at 7%, heading to 8-9% with fuel price pass-through; ceasefire-driven oil crash may slow trajectory
• Textile sector: 25-30% freight cost surge; export competitiveness under threat
• PKR under pressure; central bank burning reserves to defend currency
• Diplomatic stature gains may translate to enhanced bilateral energy deals with Gulf states and improved IMF program positioning

Structural Vulnerabilities

• 85% import-dependent on Gulf crude with no diversification
• 99% of LNG from Qatar/UAE, a single-chokepoint dependency
• No strategic petroleum reserve (no proper SPR program)
• Limited refining capacity (~450K bbl/day) with low complexity; cannot process heavy/sour grades efficiently
• No pipeline bypass infrastructure. Gwadar-Kashgar oil pipeline (CPEC) shelved; IP gas pipeline from Iran incomplete
• CPEC energy portfolio is power plants, not oil/gas supply; China offers no supply lifeline
• Declining domestic gas production (~3.5 Bcf/day) with no major new discoveries
• Fiscal fragility: IMF program constraints limit government’s ability to subsidize fuel prices

TankerBrief Coverage Angle

South Asia energy desks, IMF/World Bank policy watchers, LNG traders (Qatar long-term contract holders), shipping companies on Karachi routes, fertilizer/agriculture commodity analysts. They need: reserve drawdown tracking (OGRA vs PPDA figures), LNG terminal status, emergency procurement volumes, fuel price/subsidy decisions, IMF program compliance under crisis spending, and Pakistan-Saudi/UAE bilateral energy diplomacy.